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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                            __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
         In this civil RICO complaint, Robert A. Rehkop alleged 
that he was discharged from his position as a Certified 
Registered Nurse Anesthetist in retaliation for refusing to 
complete what he contends were fraudulent Medicare, Medicaid, and 
Medical Assistance forms and for reporting this activity to the 
FBI.  The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that 
Rehkop did not suffer an injury "substantially caused" by the 
RICO enterprise pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  The court 
further dismissed the section 1962(d) conspiracy count, after 
finding Rehkop's claim under section 1962(c) deficient.   
         We hold that the district court correctly dismissed the 
section 1962(c) count.  Nonetheless, in light of our opinion in 
Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989), 
Rehkop is not precluded from alleging a RICO conspiracy under 
section 1962(d).  Thus we will reverse the district court's 
dismissal of the conspiracy count and remand also for 
reinstatement of the pendent state law claims. 
 I.  
          
         In January of 1990, Rehkop was hired as a Certified 
Registered Nurse Anesthetist by the Berwick Healthcare 
Corporation to provide services at the Berwick Hospital Center. 
         Berwick Hospital Center provided anesthesia services to 
the public, participating in Medicare, Medicaid and Medical 
Assistance as these programs are established and administered by 
the United States of America and the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.  An anesthesiologist, David Kasputis, M.D., was 
hired to provide the anesthesia services; Alex Keris was the 
Chief Nurse Anesthetist and Manager of the Anesthesia Department.  
Keris was Rehkop's direct supervisor.  For the anesthesia 
services provided, Keris and Kasputis submitted claims for 
payment to the federal and state programs and received payment 
for covered patients.   
         Rehkop alleges that Keris and Kasputis submitted 
fraudulent claims and received payment, through the United States 
Postal Service, to which they were not entitled, subjecting them 
to civil and criminal penalties under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a, 7a and 
7b and Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 62, § 1407 and constituting mail fraud 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.   
         Rehkop further alleges that he was required to complete 
claim forms, but when he learned that the claims were fraudulent, 
he refused to do so.  He contends that he reported the activity 
to Henry Mandel, Vice-President of Human Resources of Berwick 
Hospital Center.  Although Mandel advised Rehkop that he would 
discuss the matter with Chief Financial Officer David Matisse, 
Mandel did not contact Rehkop, so Rehkop approached Matisse 
directly.  Matisse allegedly told Rehkop that he had discussed 
the situation with both Thomas Spatt, Chief Executive Officer of 
Berwick Hospital Center, and with the Board of Directors of 
Berwick Healthcare Corporation and was told not to pursue the 
matter.  Rehkop then reported these activities to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. 
         Rehkop contends that it was after these conversations 
that he began to receive unfounded and untrue disciplinary 
actions signed by Keris.  He also experienced lengthy delays in 
the payment of funds due him for his professional services and as 
reimbursement for expenses.  On October 31, 1994, Keris informed 
Rehkop that he was terminated.     
         Subsequently, Rehkop filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
alleging that the Berwick Healthcare Corporation, the Berwick 
Hospital Center, the Wyoming Valley Healthcare System, Inc., Alex 
Keris, David Kasputis, Henry Mandel, David Matisse, Thomas Spatt, 
and the Board of Directors of the Berwick Healthcare Corporation 
conspired to commit and did commit mail fraud (by submitting 
fraudulent claims for reimbursement) from approximately January, 
1990 through at least October 31, 1994.  Specifically, Rehkop 
alleged that in furtherance of the conspiracy, they undertook a 
plan of activity which led to his termination in order to conceal 
the conspiracy and to impeach his credibility should he assist 
the government in prosecuting them.  Rehkop avers that these acts 
constitute "predicate acts" which violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and 
that each of the defendants entered into a conspiracy to commit 
these acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). 
         All of the defendants filed motions to dismiss in which 
they contended that Rehkop lacked standing to pursue a civil RICO 
claim against them.  By orders dated October 10, 1995, the 
district court granted these motions and dismissed Rehkop's 
complaint in its entirety, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
 
                               II. 
          
         In enacting RICO, Congress declared that  
         [a]ny person injured in his business or 
         property by reason of a violation of section 
         1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in     
         any appropriate United States district court 
         . . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).  In order to have standing to pursue a 
claim under section 1964(c), a plaintiff must first demonstrate 
that the defendant committed a violation of one or more 
subsections of section 1962, and second, that the violation was a 
substantial cause of the injury to his business or property.  
Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1164.   
         In Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., the plaintiff, 
like Rehkop, maintained that she was terminated from her job at 
Hutton Trust in furtherance of a RICO conspiracy and 
additionally, that the defendants allegedly violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1962(a), (b), (c) and (d).  The starting point for our analysis 
of Shearin's standing under section 1964(c) was the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 
(1985).  In Sedima the Supreme Court interpreted section 1964(c) 
as requiring that the injury relied upon by a plaintiff be the 
result of a section 1962 violation.  473 U.S. at 495.  Applying 
the Sedima standard for RICO standing in Shearin's civil case, we 
held that Shearin had failed to plead injury resulting from 
defendant's violation of sections 1962(a) or (c).  885 F.2d at 
1167-68.  Shearin contended that E.F. Hutton caused her injury, 
first, in hiring her away from her previous job and then in 
firing her from Hutton when she refused to "play the good 
soldier."  Id. at 1168.  We concluded that neither job loss could 
be said to have resulted from violations of any of RICO's first 
three subsections or from the predicate acts necessary to 
establish them.  Rather, "if the Hutton Companies' predicate acts 
under section 1962(a) or (c) injured anybody, they injured those 
Hutton customers whom the securities scheme defrauded."  Id. 
         Although we held that Shearin lacked standing to pursue 
a civil RICO remedy for racketeering activity pursuant to section 
1962(c), we found that she had standing to bring an action for 
alleged conspiracy in violation of RICO's section 1962(d).  We 
observed that "while the section 1962(a) and (c) violations she 
alleges injured only customers, that is not so with respect to 
the alleged section 1962(d) conspiracy."  885 F.2d at 1168.  
Shearin's contentions that "Hutton Trust hired her as window 
dressing to perpetuate the fraud that it was a legitimate 
company" and her contention that she "was fired to preserve the 
same fraud when she would not participate" qualified as predicate 
acts under section 1962(d).  Id.  Accordingly, we held that 
Shearin's hiring and firing plausibly constituted overt acts that 
could establish a conspiracy, and "[a]ssuming that the hiring and 
firing were injuries, those injuries did occur `by reason of' 
Huttons' violation of section 1962(d)."  885 F.2d at 1168-69.  
Thus we concluded that Shearin's allegations stated a claim for 
relief pursuant to section 1964(c). 
 
                               III. 
         In Count I of his complaint, Rehkop alleged that while 
he was employed as a nurse anesthetist at the Berwick Hospital 
Center, the defendants conspired to defraud Medicare and Medicaid 
by filing fraudulent claims for payment using the U.S. Postal 
Service.  Rehkop averred that these acts constituted "predicate 
acts" which violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), upon which a civil RICO 
claim may be based pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).  A violation 
of § 1962(c) requires (1) the conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) 
through a pattern of racketeering activity.  Sedima, 473 U.S. at 
495.  In addition, the plaintiff only has standing if he has been 
injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting 
the violation.  Id. 
         Here, in addressing Rehkop's assertion that the 
defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the district court 
concluded that the filing of fraudulent claims with Medicare and 
Medicaid may constitute a predicate act providing the basis for 
liability under section 1962(c).  See United States v. Khan, 53 
F.3d 507 (2d Cir. 1995).  We agree with this conclusion.  We also 
agree with the court's conclusion that Rehkop's complaint, 
however, failed to allege that he suffered an injury which was 
substantially caused by the defendants' alleged violations of 
section 1962(c).  In this regard, the district court observed 
that the only injury Rehkop alleged was his firing from Berwick 
Hospital Center.  The defendants' alleged racketeering 
activities, however, did not substantially cause Rehkop to lose  
his job.  Rather, the direct victims of the alleged racketeering 
were the Medicare and Medicaid programs and the taxpayers.  Thus, 
Rehkop did not have standing to sue the defendants pursuant to 
section 1964(c) based upon their alleged violations of section 
1962(c).  Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1168. 
         Rehkop also claimed that the defendants entered into a 
conspiracy to commit violations of section 1962(c) in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. section 1962(d) which provides that:  "It shall be 
unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the 
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."  The 
district court held that Rehkop lacks standing to pursue a 
conspiracy claim under section 1962(d) because, in its opinion, 
such a claim requires that the plaintiff state a viable cause of 
action under another section of 1962 as well.  Insofar as Rehkop 
could not go forward on his section 1962(c) claim, the court 
reasoned, his section 1962(d) claim also failed.   
         The district court's decision was influenced by 
Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993), 
which it viewed as superseding Shearin.  The court, however, 
misconstrued our holding in Lightning Lube.  There we held that 
in order to state a violation of section 1962(d) for conspiracy 
to violate subsection (a), (b), or (c), the plaintiff must 
establish that the defendants violated (or were going to violate) 
one of those subsections.  The problem in Lightning Lube was that 
the actions alleged to constitute violations of subsections 
1962(a), (b), and (c) were not violations of these subsections, 
and thus they also failed to serve as the object of a section 
1962(d) conspiracy. 
         Lightning Lube is thus distinguishable.  In this case, 
Rehkop's allegations state a violation of section 1962(c).  The 
reason he cannot pursue such a claim is that he was not harmed by 
the section 1962(c) violation.  Nonetheless, the defendants' 
alleged violation of section 1962(c) can serve as the object of a 
section 1962(d) conspiracy, and if Rehkop was harmed by reason of 
the conspiracy, he may pursue a section 1962(d) claim. 
         Thus, this case is within Shearin's rule that a 
plaintiff's allegation that he or she was harmed in furtherance 
of a conspiracy under 1962(d) states a claim for relief under 
section 1964(c).  Although the defendants contend that Rehkop has 
failed to allege a distinct RICO enterprise; that he has failed 
to plead his allegations of fraud with sufficient particularity 
as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); and that he has not 
adequately pled the existence of a conspiracy, we need not reach 
these issues at this juncture.  On remand, the plaintiff will 
have ample opportunity to amend so as to sharpen his pleadings 
and refine his theories. 
         We acknowledge that a majority of courts have disagreed 
with Shearin and have held that only injuries caused by RICO 
predicate acts provide standing to sue for conspiracy claims.  
We need not defend Shearin here.  It is the law of this circuit, 
and there will be time to explore its correctness if the issue 
goes en banc.  See section 9.1 of our Internal Operating 
Procedures; O. Hommel Company v. Ferro Corporation, 659 F.2d 
340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981) (". . .a panel of this court cannot 
overrule a prior panel precedent.").   
         Although other courts of appeals have taken a different 
path than we did in Shearin, the Supreme Court has not spoken on 
this issue and Congress has not acted to remedy the division.  As 
a result, we continue to be bound by our Internal Operating 
Procedures and appropriately must follow our precedent set forth 
in Shearin.  Therefore, Rehkop's termination, as with Shearin's 
hiring and firing, is sufficient to constitute an overt act of an 
alleged conspiracy and an injury sustained by reason of a 
violation of section 1962.   
 
                               IV. 
         Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
district court dismissing the section 1962(d) claim.  In 
addition, we will vacate the judgment of the district court 
dismissing Rehkop's claims pursuant to the Pennsylvania 
Whistleblower Law, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 1421 et seq., and 
wrongful discharge so that they may be reconsidered by the 
district court.  In all other respects, we will affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
         Each side to bear its own costs. 
 
